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Abstract—With the recent development of deep learning on
steganalysis, embedding secret information into digital images
faces great challenges. In this paper, a secure steganography algo-
rithm by using adversarial training is proposed. The architecture
contain three component modules: a generator, an embedding
simulator and a discriminator. A generator based on U-NET to
translate a cover image into an embedding change probability is
proposed. To fit the optimal embedding simulator and propagate
the gradient, a function called Tanh-simulator is proposed. As
for the discriminator, the selection-channel awareness (SCA)
is incorporated to resist the SCA based steganalytic methods.
Experimental results have shown that the proposed framework
can increase the security performance dramatically over the
recently reported method ASDL-GAN, while the training time
is only 30% of that used by ASDL-GAN. Furthermore, it also
performs better than the hand-crafted steganographic algorithm
S-UNIWARD.
Index Terms—Steganography, Steganalysis, Generative adver-
sarial network (GAN).
I. INTRODUCTION
Image steganography is a kind of technology to embed
secret information into a cover image without drawing sus-
picion. With the development of steganalysis methods, it
becomes a great challenge to design a secure stegnographic
scheme. Because the efficient coding schemes [1] can embed
messages close to the payload-distortion bound, the main
task of image steganography is to minimize a well designed
additive distortion function. In an adaptive steganography
scheme, every pixel is assigned a cost to quantify the effect
of making modification and the distortion is evaluated by
summing up costs. Secret information is generally embedded
in noisy regions or regions with texture, while smooth regions
are avoided for data embedding, as done by HUGO [2], WOW
[3], HILL [4], S-UNIWARD [5] and MiPOD [6].
In recent years, convolutional neural networks (CNN) have
become a dominant machine learning approach in image
classification tasks with the improvements in computer hard-
ware and network architecture [7, 8]. Current researches have
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indicated that CNN also obtained considerable achievements
in the field of steganalysis. Tan and Li [9] used the stacked
convolutional auto-encoder for steganalysis. Qian et al [10, 11]
proposed a CNN structure equipped with Gaussian non-linear
activation, and they showed that feature representations can be
transferred from high embedding payload to low embedding
payload. Xu et al [12, 13] proposed a CNN structure (referred
to as XuNet in this paper) that is able to achieve comparable
performance to conventional spatial rich model (SRM) [14].
The Tanh and ReLU have been used in shallow and deep
layers respectively. Batch-normalization [15] was equipped to
prevent the network from falling into local minima. Yang et al
[16] incorporated selection-channel awareness (SCA) into the
CNN architecture. Ye et al [17] proposed a structure that
incorporates high-pass filters from SRM, the SCA also be
incorporated in CNN architecture. In [18], Yang et al proposed
a deep learning architecture by improving the pre-processing
layer and the feature reuse for JPEG steganalysis, experimental
results shows that it can obtain state-of-the art performance
for JPEG steganalysis. Although CNN has been successfully
used for steganalysis, it is still in initial stage with regarding
to applying it for steganography.
So far, the generative adversarial network (GAN) [19] has
been widely used for image generation [20, 21]. In [22], Tang
et al proposed an automatic steganographic distortion learning
framework with GAN (named as ASDL-GAN shortly). The
probability of data embedding is learned via the adversarial
training between the generator and the discriminator. The
generator contains 25 groups, with every group starts with
a convolutional layer, followed by batch normalization and a
ReLU layer. The architecture of XuNet was employed as the
discriminator. In order to fit the optimal embedding simulator
[23] as well as propagate the gradient in back propagation,
they proposed a ternary embedding simulator (TES) acti-
vation function. The reported experimental results showed
that ASDL-GAN can learn steganographic distortions, but the
performance is still inferior to the conventional steganographic
scheme S-UNIWARD.
In this work, we propose a new GAN-based steganographic
framework. Compared with the previous method ASDL-GAN
[22], the main contributions of this paper are as follows.
(1) An activation function called Tanh-simulator is proposed
to solve the problem that optimal embedding simula-
tor cannot propagate gradient. The TES sub-network of
ASDL-GAN needs a long time to pre-train with even 106
iterations, while the Tanh-simulator can be used directly
with high fitting accuracy.
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2(2) A more compact generator based on U-NET [24] has been
proposed. This subnet can improves security performance
and decreases training time dramatically.
(3) Considering adversarial training, we enhance the dis-
criminator by incorporating SCA into the discriminator
to improve the performance of resisting SCA based
steganalytic schemes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The proposed
architecture is described in Section II. Experimental results
and analysis is shown in Section III. The practical application
of the proposed architecture is shown in Section IV. The
conclusion and future works are presented in Section V.
II. THE PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE
In this section, firstly, we present the overall architecture of
the proposed method based on generative adversarial network
(referred as UT-SCA-GAN), which incorporates the U-net
based generator, the proposed Tanh-simulator function and the
SCA based discriminator. Secondly, the definition of the loss
functions is introduced. Then, the details of the generator and
the proposed Tanh-simulator function are described. Finally,
we present the design consideration of the discriminator.
A. Overall Architecture
The proposed overall architecture is shown in Fig. 1. The
training steps are described as follows:
(1) Translate a cover image into an embedding change prob-
ability map by using the generator.
(2) Given an embedding change probability map and a
randomly generated matrix with uniform distribution of
[0,1], compute the modification map by using the pro-
posed Tanh-simulator.
(3) Generate the stego image by adding the cover image and
its corresponding modification map.
(4) Feed cover/stego pairs and the corresponding embedding
change probability map into the discriminator.
(5) Alternately update the parameters of generator and dis-
criminator.
B. The Loss Functions
The loss function of the discriminator is defined as follows:
lD = −
2∑
i=1
y
′
ilog(yi) (1)
where yi is the Softmax output of the discriminator, while y
′
i
is the corresponding truth label of cover/stego.
The loss function of the generator is defined as follows [22]:
lG = −α× lD + β × (C −H ×W ×Q)2 (2)
where H and W are the height and width of the cover image,
Q denotes the embedding payload, and C is the capacity that
guarantees the payloads:
C =
H∑
i=1
W∑
j=1
−p+1i,j log2p+1i,j − p−1i,j log2p−1i,j − p0i,j log2p0i,j (3)
p−1i,j = p
+1
i,j = pi,j/2 (4)
p0i,j + p
−1
i,j + p
+1
i,j = 1 (5)
where pi,j denotes the output embedding probability of the
generator corresponding to the pixel xi,j , p+1i,j and p
−1
i,j denote
the modify probability of adding or subtracting 1, while p0i,j
denote the probability of the corresponding pixel xi,j will not
be modified.
C. Generator Design
Motivated by an elegant architecture “U-Net” [24], which
was used for biomedical image segmentation, we design an
efficient generator for secure steganography based on U-Net.
A typical architecture of U-Net is shown in Fig. 2. The detailed
configuration of the proposed generator is shown in Table
I. Note that in the contracting path, each group shown in
the table corresponds to the sequence of convolution, batch
normalization and Leaky-ReLU. A group of the expanding
path corresponds to the sequence of deconvolution, batch
normalization and ReLU. The last layer ensures that the em-
bedding probability ranges from 0 to 0.5 by considering large
embedding probability may caused the embedding process be
easily detected [25]. The Leaky-ReLU activation function is
defined as follows:
f(x) =
{
x x > 0
αx x 6 0
(6)
To prevent the “dying ReLU” problem, we set α = 0.2. The
main characteristics of the generator are described as follows:
(1) It is composed of the contracting path and the expanding
path. The former follows the typical architecture of a
convolutional neural network while the latter mainly
consists of deconvolution operations.
(2) In order to achieve pixel-level learning and facilitate the
back-propagation of gradients, there are concatenation
connections between every pair of mirrored layers with
the same size, such as layers 1 and 15, layers 2 and 14,
etc.
(3) The middle layers capture the global information of the
image, while both sides of the generator provide local
information.
Different from the 25-layer generator in ASDL-GAN [22],
here the pre-processing layer is not used. In addition, the
generator converges quickly and trains faster due to skipping
connections and low memory consumption.
D. Tanh-simulator Function
In the previous adaptive steganography methods [2–6],
stego image is generated by adding the cover image and
the corresponding modification map. The modification map
is computed by using an optimal embedding simulator [23],
which is a staircase function:
mi,j =

−1 if ni,j < pi,j/2
1 if ni,j > 1− pi,j/2
0 otherwise.
(7)
3Generator
(U-Net)
HPF
cover image
stego image
Discriminator
＋
Tanh-
simulator
XuNetprobability  map modification map 
|HPF| ＋
random matrix
Fig. 1: Steganographic architecture of the proposed UT-SCA-GAN.
TABLE I: Configuration details of the proposed generator.
Layers Output size Kernels size Process
Input 1× (512× 512) / Convolution-BN-Leaky ReLU
Layer 1 16× (256× 256) 16× (3× 3× 1) Convolution-BN-Leaky ReLU
Layer 2 32× (128× 128) 32× (3× 3× 16) Convolution-BN-Leaky ReLU
Layer 3 64× (64× 64) 64× (3× 3× 32) Convolution-BN-Leaky ReLU
Layer 4 128× (32× 32) 128× (3× 3× 64) Convolution-BN-Leaky ReLU
Layer 5 128× (16× 16) 128× (3× 3× 128) Convolution-BN-Leaky ReLU
Layer 6 128× (8× 8) 128× (3× 3× 128) Convolution-BN-Leaky ReLU
Layer 7 128× (4× 4) 128× (3× 3× 128) Convolution-BN-Leaky ReLU
Layer 8 128× (2× 2) 128× (3× 3× 128) Convolution-BN-Leaky ReLU
Layer 9 256× (4× 4) 128× (5× 5× 128) Deconvolution-BN-ReLU-Concatenate
Layer 10 256× (8× 8) 128× (5× 5× 128) Deconvolution-BN-ReLU-Concatenate
Layer 11 256× (16× 16) 128× (5× 5× 256) Deconvolution-BN-ReLU-Concatenate
Layer 12 256× (32× 32) 128× (5× 5× 256) Deconvolution-BN-ReLU-Concatenate
Layer 13 128× (64× 64) 64× (5× 5× 256) Deconvolution-BN-ReLU-Concatenate
Layer 14 64× (128× 128) 32× (5× 5× 128) Deconvolution-BN-ReLU-Concatenate
Layer 15 32× (256× 256) 16× (5× 5× 64) Deconvolution-BN-ReLU-Concatenate
Layer 16 1× (512× 512) 1× (5× 5× 32) Deconvolution-BN-ReLU-Concatenate
Layer 17 1× (512× 512) / ReLU((Sigmoid-0.5))
where pi,j is the embedding change probability, ni,j is the
random number generated from a uniform distribution between
0 and 1, mi,j is the embedding value.
Because the staircase function (7) cannot convey the gradi-
ent during back propagation, we use the Tanh function to fit
the embedding simulator. We called the proposed activation
function Tanh-simulator. It can be described as follows:
m′i,j = −0.5× tanh (λ (pi,j − 2× ni,j))+
0.5× tanh (λ (pi,j − 2× (1− ni,j)))
(8)
tanh (x) =
ex − e−x
ex + e−x
(9)
where λ is the scaling factor, which controls the slope at the
junction of stairs. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 illustrate the function
curves of the Tanh-simulator and the staircase function (7) in
2D and 3D respectively. It can be seen that with the increment
of parameter λ, Tanh-simulator is becoming more similar to
the staircase function (7). Note that we need some discrete
points to convey the gradient, considering the conveyance of
gradient and fitting accuracy, wet set λ = 1000.
E. Discriminator Design
Discriminator is a steganalytic tool in this framework.
Considering the adversarial training between steganography
and steganalysis, we infer that the enhancement of the dis-
criminator will certainly force the steganography to be more
secure.
To resist the current SCA based steganalysis method, we
incorporate SCA into the discriminator. The |HPF | in Fig. 1
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Fig. 2: Typical architecture of the U-Net.
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(a) Tanh-simulator (λ=1000)
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(b) embedding simulator [23]
Fig. 3: Function curves of the Tanh-simulator and the em-
bedding simulator in 2D space (pi,j= 0.6): (a) Tanh-simulator
(λ=1000), (b) embedding simulator [23].
denote the absolute value of the 30 high pass filters from SRM
to consider the statistical measure [17]. Through adversarial
training, the generator will adjust the parameters to resist the
SCA based discriminator. In addition, the embedding change
probability map bypasses the Tanh-simulator will accelerate
the gradient propagation in adversarial training.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Experimental Setting
All experiments are conducted on the SZUBase [22] and
BOSSBase-1.01 [26] which contains images with size of
512 × 512. The first dataset that contains 40,000 grayscale
cover images is used to train the proposed architecture. The
second dataset that contains 10,000 grayscale images is used to
generate stego images. 5,000 pairs of images from BOSSBase
are randomly selected to train the ensemble classifier [27],
and the left 5,000 pairs are used as the test set. We use the
Adam optimizer with the learning rate of 0.0001 to train the
model over 160,000 iterations (32 epochs). During training,
8 cover/stego pairs are used as input in each iteration. The
parameters α, β are set to 1, and 10−7, respectively. All
experiments are performed with TensorFlow on a GTX 1080
Ti GPU card.
-1
1
-0.5
1
0
M
o
fi
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
 v
a
lu
e
0.5
Random number
0.5
Prob
ablit
y va
lue
1
0.5
0 0
(a)
-1
1
-0.5
1
0
M
o
fi
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
 v
a
lu
e
0.5
Random number
0.5
Prob
ablit
y va
lue
1
0.5
0 0
(b)
-1
1
-0.5
1
0
M
o
fi
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
 v
a
lu
e
0.5
Random number
0.5
Prob
ablit
y va
lue
1
0.5
0 0
(c)
-1
1
-0.5
1
0
M
o
fi
d
ic
a
ti
o
n
 v
a
lu
e
0.5
Random number
0.5
Prob
ablit
y va
lue
1
0.5
0 0
(d)
Fig. 4: Comparison between Tanh-simulator and embedding
simulator in 3D space: (a) Tanh-simulator (λ=1), (b) Tanh-
simulator (λ=10), (c) Tanh-simulator (λ=1000), (d) embedding
simulator [23].
B. Experiments on resized dataset
In this part, we conduct experiments to investigate the
influence of different parts of the proposed architecture. The
original dataset of SZUBase and BOSSbase-1.01 are resized
to 256 × 256 by “imresize()” function in Matlab.
Firstly, we conduct experiments on UT-GAN, which is the
variant of UT-SCA-GAN without SCA. We vary the UT-GAN
as follows:
(1) Variant #1, replace the proposed generator with the gen-
erator of ASDL-GAN.
(2) Variant #2, replace the Tanh-Simulator with the TES
network of ASDL-GAN.
Experimental results tested on BOSSBase 256 × 256 are
shown on Table II. All of the methods are embedded messages
with payload 0.4 bpp. From Table II, it can be seen that
the performance will decrease dramatically if we replace the
generator or embedding simulator with the corresponding parts
of the ASDL-GAN. Replacement of the generator caused the
greatest performance reduction, it is because the proposed
generator directly determines the adaptability and security of
the steganographic scheme. The Tanh-simulator also achieves
better performance than the TES network, the result might be
caused by high fitting accuracy. In addition, the proposed UT-
GAN also obtains better performance than ASDL-GAN and
S-UNIWARD.
Next, we conduct experiments with the UT-SCA-GAN
which incorporates SCA in the discriminator to verify the
influence of SCA. The payload of UT-SCA-GAN and UT-
GAN are set as 0.4 bpp. We test the performance by SRM
and maxSRMd2. Experimental results are show on Table III.
As we expected, the incorporation of SCA to the discrimina-
tor will improve the security performance by about 2.0% to re-
sist SCA based steganalysis method, e.g. maxSRMd2. Because
5TABLE II: Error rates (%) of different steganographic schemes detected by SRM [14] on BOSSbase 256 × 256.
Algorithm UT-GAN Variant #1 Variant #2 ASDL-GAN [22] S-UNIWARD[5]
Error rates 26.61 20.29 23.06 20.68 22.26
the SCA is incorporated into the discriminator, the parameters
of generator can be automatically adjusted according to the
structure of discriminator via the adversarial training.
TABLE III: Error rates (%) of UT-GAN and UT-SCA-GAN
on BOSSBase 256 × 256.
Net-work maxSRMd2 SRM
UT-GAN 20.27 26.61
UT-SCA-GAN 22.30 26.43
C. Experiments on full size dataset
In this part, we conduct experiments on size of 512 ×512
to compare with previous method. For 0.1 bpp, we finetune
the architecture from the trained model with 0.4 bpp. We
find this process will improves the security performance by
about 1.0%. For 0.2 bpp, we only compare with S-UNIWARD
because work [22] did not run experiment on this payload. It is
observed from Table IV that the proposed UT-GAN performs
better than ASDL-GAN by 4.96% and 7.80% for 0.4 bpp
and 0.1 bpp respectively. It also obtained better performance
than S-UNIWARD. From Table V, the incorporation of SCA
can also improve the performance on full size image of 512
×512. The performance improvement of incorporation of SCA
will be more significantly with the increment of payload.
This is may because of the hard training for low payload by
using deep-leaning based method, no matter steganalysis or
steganography.
TABLE IV: Error rates (%) of different steganographic
schemes detected by SRM [14] on BOSSBase 512 × 512.
Payload UT-GAN ASDL-GAN [22] S-UNIWARD [5]
0.4 bpp 22.36 17.40 20.54
0.2 bpp 33.03 / 31.89
0.1 bpp 40.82 33.02 40.40
TABLE V: Error rates (%) of different steganographic schemes
detected by maxSRMd2 [28].
Payload UT-SCA-GAN UT-GAN
0.4 bpp 20.42 18.23
0.2 bpp 28.04 26.87
0.1 bpp 34.89 34.64
In addition, we also compare the training time of UT-GAN
and ASDL-GAN in one epoch. ASDL-GAN needs 4.65 hours,
while UT-GAN only needs 1.30 hours. Thus the proposed
method saves almost 100 hours for 32 epoch (41.6 hours vs
148.8 hours). There are two reasons for this difference. One
reason is the simple architecture of proposed generator, as
opposed to the 25-layer generator of the ASDL-GAN. What’s
more, the time consumption of the proposed Tanh-Simulator
function is negligible compared to the two independent 4-layer
TES sub-network of ASDL-GAN.
We present the embedding change probability maps and
modification position maps with payloads of 0.4 bpp and 0.1
bpp in Fig. 5. From (b) and (d), it can be seen that embedding
change probability value of the texture regions are larger than
the smooth regions. From (c) and (e), the embedding change
position are also concentrated on regions with large embedding
change probability values. Fig. 5 shows that the proposed
steganography scheme is content-adaptively.
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED
ARCHITECTURE
In this work, our task is to learn the embedding probability
pi,j by adversarial training. For every pixel of the cover image,
the proposed Tanh-simulator has been used to simulate the
embedding process. In a practical application scenario, it is
necessary to compute the embedding cost by taking full use
the learned embedding probability, and then using the Syn-
drome Trellis codes [1] to embed the secret information. The
embedding cost ρij for the practical steganographic coding
scheme can be computed as follows [6]:
ρij = ln(1/pi,j − 2)) (10)
We embed the binary image that has only two possible val-
ues 0 and 1 into the cover image. The flowchart of embedding
and extracting are show on Fig. 6. The embedding change
probability denotes the probability learned form adversarial
training. Fig. 7 show an example of embedding process.
Experimental results show that all of the secret message can
be recovered by STC scheme, and the embedding positions are
also located in complex region. Thus the proposed steganog-
raphy scheme can improve the security performance and also
can be used for practical application.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a secure steganographic scheme based on
generative adversarial network is proposed. A Tanh-simulator
function was proposed to fit the optimal embedding simulator.
A compact generator based on U-Net architecture is employed
as the generator. To resist the current advanced steganaly-
sis methods maxSRMd2, selection channel awareness (SCA)
are incorporated into the discriminator. Experimental results
showed that the proposed architecture outperforms the ASDL-
GAN method dramatically by using less training time. Further
more, it also obtained better performance than the hand-crafted
method S-UNIWARD.
In our future work, we will explore the relationship between
the architectures of generator and discriminator so as to boost
the security performance. In addition, we would like to apply
the proposed scheme to the JPEG domain.
6(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 5: Illustration of the proposed UT-GAN. (a) The BOSSBase cover image “1013.pgm” with a size of 512 × 512, (b)
embedding change probability (0.4 bpp), (c) modification map (0.4 bpp), (d) embedding change probability map (0.1 bpp), (e)
modification map (0.1 bpp).
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Fig. 6: Flowchart of practical embedding process.
(a)
secret message
(b) (c) (d)
secret message
(e)
Fig. 7: Illustration of the practical application of proposed UT-SCA-GAN. (a) The BOSSBase cover image “1013.pgm” with
a size of 256 × 256, (b) secrete message (with a size of 128 × 128), (c) stego image, (d) modification map, (e) recovered
message.
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